Mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990) proposes that deliberative mindsets are marked by more open-minded processing of information, whereas implemental mindsets are characterized by more closed-minded processing. Accordingly, deliberative and implemental mindsets should diVer in selective processing of incidental information when performing a central task. In three experiments, participants in deliberative and implemental mindsets performed a computer task while randomly presented incidental, unavoidable words. A subsequent recognition memory test assessed selective processing of these incidental words. Results revealed that deliberative mindsets led to superior recognition memory, suggesting increased open-mindedness to processing incidental information. Implications for mindset and goal theories are discussed. 
Introduction
The cognitive processes that support and maintain goal pursuit have become a central issue among researchers studying motivation (Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1994; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2001; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986) . Mindset theory was one of the Wrst theories to describe the complex interplay between cognitive and motivational processes, and continues to be one of the most prominent and inXuential frameworks (Gollwitzer, 1990 ).
This theoretical model posits that there are multiple stages of goal pursuit, called action phases, which individuals must successfully navigate to attain a goal. In particular, the theory assumes that each phase is characterized by a distinct task that must be accomplished. The two most important of these tasks are choosing a goal and implementing a chosen goal. Whereas individuals must deliberate between the many wishes and desires they might have when choosing a goal, they must plan out when and how to act to implement a chosen goal. Central to the theory is the notion that actively choosing a goal and planning the implementation of a goal activates distinct mindsets, or cognitive procedures, that promote successful navigation through the respective action phases. The studies reported in this paper build upon and advance a body of research that has demonstrated the theoretical and empirical distinction between deliberative and implemental mindsets; that is, diVerences in information processing when one is engaged in choosing a goal as compared to implementing a chosen goal.
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Empirical support for mindset theory
A great deal of empirical research has explored the unique cognitive features of deliberative and implemental mindsets (summaries by Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999; Gollwitzer, Fujita, & Oettingen, 2004) , those cognitive procedures associated with choosing a goal and those procedures associated with planning and executing actions relevant to a chosen goal, respectively. This research has demonstrated mindset diVerences primarily in two domains: cognitive tuning and biased inferences.
Thought-sampling research (Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Puca & Schmalt, 2001; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) has shown that the thoughts of individuals in a deliberative mindset are tuned to expectancy-value considerations, focusing on issues of goal desirability and feasibility. The thoughts of those in implemental mindsets, on the other hand, are dominated by thoughts of the when, where, and how of goal implementation. Individuals in a deliberative mindset also selectively process and attend to expectancyvalue information, whereas those in an implemental mindset attend to goal implementation information (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990) . These results suggest that the deliberative and implemental mindsets are cognitively tuned to distinct concerns, namely choosing between goals and implementing a chosen goal, respectively.
In addition to activating action phase-appropriate thought content, mindset theory suggests that deliberative mindsets should be characterized by an even-handed (impartial) and objective (realistic) analysis of information to allow for good goal decisions (i.e., select goals that are both highly desirable and feasible). In contrast, as questioning one's decision and commitment to a goal can undermine eVorts to attain the chosen goal, implemental mindsets should foster biased information processing that reinforces and supports one's intention to reach the goal. Indeed, a great deal of research has shown that the implemental mindset, as compared to the deliberative mindset, leads to more biased positive evaluations and higher expectations of goal success (Armor & Taylor, 2003; Gagné & Lydon, 2001; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Puca, 2001; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) . Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995, Study 3) have shown, for example, that in contrast to individuals in a deliberative mindset who engage in balanced considerations of pros and cons while making a decision, individuals in an implemental mindset consider pros Wve times more frequently than cons. Those in implemental mindsets are also more likely to overestimate the amount of control they have over their environment ("illusions of control"; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989 ) and how well they can perform on various tasks (Puca, 2001) , whereas those in deliberative mindsets are more realistic (i.e., accurate). These Wndings suggest that as one progresses from choosing a goal to actually implementing a chosen goal, individuals make more biased inferences to defend their goal decision and to protect the realization of the chosen goal.
Mindsets and open-mindedness
Beyond diVerences in cognitive tuning and biased inferences, deliberative and implemental mindsets should also diVer in openness to information. Task analysis of the demands of making a goal decision suggests that deliberative mindsets should be associated with enhanced receptivity to all sources and types of information. To make good decisions, one should be open to any available information that might potentially inform one's decision-making. One should be careful not to dismiss information prematurely as it may ultimately be useful or helpful in making good goal decisions. Implemental mindsets, in contrast, should be associated with more selective information processing. Once a goal is set, successful goal implementation requires more particular Wltering of information, selectively processing goal-relevant stimuli while ignoring goal-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990; Kuhl, 1984) . For these reasons, the deliberative mindset should be associated with greater openness to information incidental to one's goals.
An early study by Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987, Study 2) bears some relevance to this hypothesis. Participants were interrupted either while they were deliberating a choice between two diVerent creativity tests (deliberative mindset), or just after having chosen one of them (implemental mindset), and verbally presented with lists of 5-7 one-syllable nouns (e.g., house, art, and tree). Immediately after each list had been presented, participants had to recall the words in order. Participants' performance in this task was used to compute their working memory span (i.e., noun span), and results indicated that deliberative mindset participants evidenced a broader span (about half a word more) than implemental mindset participants.
The superior noun span by deliberative as compared to implemental mindset participants, however, only suggests that deliberative mindset participants are more capable of storing information (i.e., they have a broader working memory span). Although broadened working memory suggests an enhanced capacity to process information, it does not directly address the hypothesis that deliberative mindsets, as compared to implemental mindsets, are associated with heightened processing of information that is incidental to one's goals. The information in the word lists used in the Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987) study cannot be considered incidental. Participants were explicitly asked to correctly reproduce as many words as possible of each presented word list. Moreover, broader working memory span by itself does not necessarily lead to more or less selective processing of incidental information. Accordingly, whereas the Heckhausen and Gollwitzer study demonstrated mindset diVerences in working memory capacity, the present line of research attempts a critical, more speciWc test of the hypothesis that there are diVerences between the deliberative and implemental mindset in the selective processing of incidental information.
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The present studies
The present studies were designed to test the processing of incidental information in deliberative and implemental mindsets. SpeciWcally, we were interested in documenting diVerences in selective processing of information incidental to performing a central task at hand (see below). An additional aim of this study was to show that these changes in selective processing occur preconsciously (i.e., without conscious intent or regulation). Selective processing of information can be driven by conscious information search and exposure strategies. For example, an individual might intentionally avert their eyes away from stimuli they deem to be task-irrelevant and distracting. We were interested, however, in those cognitive procedures that occur without the explicit intention or knowledge of the individual. That is, are there pre-conscious processes associated with deliberative and implemental mindsets that help guide an individual's selective processing of incidental information?
We used a paradigm in which participants performed a primary task while presented with incidental information as distractions or impairments to performance on the primary task. Such a paradigm makes it clear to both researchers and participants what is central and incidental while performing the task at hand. Moreover, it was necessary to bypass conscious information search and exposure strategies (active avoidance strategies such as averting one's gaze) to Wnd evidence for pre-conscious rather than conscious diVerences in cognitive procedures between mindsets. Accordingly, to measure diVerences in selective processing between mindsets, we created a computer performance task that required participants to attend to the center of the screen. While performing the task (which involved counting objects that were presented in the middle of the screen), participants were brieXy presented with words incidental to the task at hand prior to half of the trials. Each word was presented randomly in the same location as materials for the primary performance task (i.e., in the center of their visual Weld) to prevent strategic anticipation and avoidance. Moreover, the stimuli were presented for only 300 ms before being replaced by the primary performance task materials, a presentation time generally considered to be too fast for interventions by conscious intent (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Neely, 1977) . Participants were then given a surprise recognition memory test of the incidental words. As participants could not avoid exposure to these words via conscious information search and exposure strategies, any diVerences in the processing of incidental stimuli between conditions can be attributed to pre-conscious procedures of the mindsets. If deliberative and implemental mindsets diVer in degree of selective processing, there should be diVerences in performance on the recognition memory test.
We used this paradigm in all three experiments presented in this paper, utilizing recognition memory task performance as our measure of selective processing. To induce deliberative and implemental mindsets, in Study 1 we had participants complete the performance task described above while in the midst of deliberating a decision or immediately after making such a decision (e.g., Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989 , Study 1). Participants were given the illusion of being able to choose between two versions of the performance task. Half of them chose immediately which version to perform (implemental condition), while the other half was asked to delay their decision until after they had "tried out" both versions (deliberative condition). In reality, regardless of condition or choice of task, both groups performed the same task (the performance and measurement tasks described above). To replicate and extend our Wndings, in Studies 2 and 3 we used a diVerent mindset manipulation, inducing mindsets with a classic mindset priming technique (e.g., Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989, Study 2; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) . Participants were asked to deliberate over a goal decision or plan out the implementation of a goal decision in an ostensibly "separate" study. In addition, Study 3 included a control condition in which participants engaged in a mindset-neutral thought-listing task. Participants in both Studies 2 and 3 were then asked to complete the performance and recognition memory tasks described previously to measure the indirect or "carry-over" eVects of each respective mindset. Across all three studies, we expected diVerences between deliberative and implemental mindsets on recognition memory performance, demonstrating changes in selective processing (and hence pre-conscious open-and closedminded processing of incidental information) as a function of these mindsets.
Study 1
Method Participants
Forty-six students at New York University participated in the study in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to condition, with 24 in the deliberative mindset condition and 22 in the implemental mindset condition.
Materials and procedures
Participants were run individually or in groups of two by one of two experimenters.
1 They were each seated in front of a computer inside a soundproof cubicle, which prevented them from seeing and hearing any other participant. They were all told that they were participating in a study that was ostensibly designed to measure their concentration potential. Participants were then informed that there were two diVerent computer tasks designed for this purpose, one based on "verbal stimuli" and the other based on "spatial stimuli." The experimenter carefully explained to all partic-
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ipants that they could demonstrate their true potential only if they picked the task that was "right" for them. Unbeknownst to the participants, the two "diVerent" computer tasks were the same task. Participants were presented with the illusion of two tasks to create an experimental situation in which they had to make a goal decision (for similar manipulations of mindsets, see Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989, Study 1; Gollwitzer et al., 1990 , Study 1).
Mindset manipulations. Participants in the deliberative mindset condition were instructed to suspend any preconceptions about whether they preferred verbal or spatial stimuli. They were told that the best decision could be made only after they had tried each type of task. While trying out the tasks, participants were instructed to consider carefully whether it was the right task for them, but not to make up their minds until they had performed both. They were then given a choice which task they wanted to try Wrst. The task they subsequently performed was the same task performed by the implemental mindset condition. To prevent a premature goal decision made on the basis of the choice of which task to try Wrst, after participants indicated their choice, they were reminded to ask themselves continually whether they felt that the task they were performing would most accurately demonstrate their concentration potential. In this way, participants were instructed to continue deliberating over their goal decision while performing the task. When participants were Wnished, they were informed that they would not have to perform the other task nor make a Wnal decision as to which task they wanted to perform. They then continued to the next part of the experiment.
Participants in the implemental mindset condition were asked to think about the activities they commonly engage in, and asked whether they would feel more comfortable with verbal or spatial tasks. They were urged to think deeply about this decision and to avoid impulsive choices, as they would not be able to reverse their decision. Once participants had made their decision and told the experimenter, they performed the appropriate task (which again, was the same task regardless of decision). In this way, participants in the implemental mindset condition performed the task for which they had made a goal decision.
Performance task. After participants indicated their preference, the experimenter set up a computerized version of the d2 Mental Concentration Task (Brickenkamp, 1981) . In this task, strings of d's and p's were presented in the center of the computer screen. Each letter string of 12 letters in 12-point font was presented in black ink against a white background. Above and below each letter were one, two, or no apostrophes. The participant's task was to count as quickly and as accurately as possible the number of d's that had a total of two apostrophes in a given string. Responses were indicated by pressing one of the four buttons on a response box, labeled with the numbers 4-7. Each button response had an equivalent probability of being correct. Between trials, a blank white screen was presented for 1 s. Participants were presented with three blocks of 28 trials for a total of 84 trials, of which the Wrst block were treated as practice trials and excluded from analysis.
Randomly before half of the actual timed trials, participants were presented with incidental words. Words were a mix of abstract and concrete words (e.g., BONE, ALWAYS, FLAG, EVERY). The words were presented in the center of the screen in black ink 12-point font in all capital letters. Each was presented for 300 ms, and then immediately followed by a string of d's and p's (the d2 Mental Concentration Task stimuli). A total of 28 words were presented. The words were carefully chosen so as to prevent any semantic associations between the stimuli and the performance test. No mention of the incidental words was made to the participant prior to the task. Probing questionnaires (see below) and post-experiment interviews conWrmed that participants assumed that they were presented as distractions.
2
When participants completed the computerized concentration task, they were asked to complete a series of penand-paper questionnaires. Participants Wrst completed several items designed to account for potential alternative explanations for the predicted pattern of results. Descriptions of these measures and the rationale for including them are described in more detail in the Results section. After completing all the measures (about 5 min), participants were probed for suspicion regarding the experimental manipulations. They were also asked to guess what function they thought the words in the d2 Mental Concentration Task had.
Recognition memory task. Participants were then presented with a surprise computerized recognition memory test. In the center of the computer screen, 56 words were presented one at a time. Half of these words (28) were the original words presented during the performance task. An additional 28 words matched in word length, concreteness, and familiarity, were presented as foils (Kucera & Francis, 1967) . Participants were asked to indicate as quickly as they could whether or not the word they saw was presented in the previous performance task. Each word remained on the
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screen until the participant responded. The order of the words was completely randomized. Upon completion of the recognition test, participants were fully debriefed and dismissed.
Results d2 mental concentration task performance
Performance on the d2 Mental Concentration Task by mindset was measured using two variables: number of errors and response latencies. Response latencies were transformed using a base-10 logarithmic transformation to correct for excessive skew. A 2 (condition: deliberative vs. 4 There were no signiWcant diVerences with respect to number of errors.
Recognition memory test performance
Performance on the recognition memory test was analyzed in two ways: accuracy and response latencies. To analyze accuracy, the discriminability index, AЈ was calculated for each participant on the basis of their correct hit and false alarm rates in the recognition task (Pollack & Norman, 1964) . The traditionally used discriminability index, dЈ, could not be used as false alarm rates were equal to zero on some occasions. The nonparametric AЈ has been shown to be highly correlated to the parametric dЈ (Snodgrass, Volvovitz, & WalWsh, 1972) . To analyze response latencies, all latencies less than 300 ms and greater than 3000 ms were excluded from the analysis (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) . This accounted for less than 4% of the data. Response latencies were then log-transformed to correct for excessive skew. Means of these log-transformed response latencies associated only with correct responses (i.e., hits and correct rejections) were then calculated for each participant and entered into the analysis (Anderson, 1983; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) .
Recognition accuracy 
Alternate explanations
We included several measures in our study design to account for possible alternate explanations for the obtained pattern of results. These re-interpretations of our data would suggest that the diVerences in response latencies were not a function of mindsets, but rather diVerences in degree of motivation, self-eYcacy, or type of motivation. We review each of these explanations in turn.
Degree of motivation.
One possible alternate interpretation would suggest that the diVerences in recognition test performance resulted not from diVerences in mindset, but rather in the magnitude of motivation the participants experienced in the two conditions. Recall that while participants in the implemental mindset chose which task they wanted to perform, participants in the deliberative mindset merely chose which task they wanted to try Wrst. One might argue that participants in the latter condition did not take the task as seriously as the former. From this perspective, diVerences between conditions on the recognition memory test would have resulted from one group being more motivated than the other. If this were true, one might not be surprised to see that the deliberative mindset participants processed incidental words to a greater extent than those in the implemental mindset if they were less motivated to perform well on the central task.
To address this alternate account, we compared responses to the two items tapping into participants' commitment to performing well on the computer task ("How committed were you to performing well on the task?" and "How upset would you be if you performed poorly on the task?"). Participants responded using 9-item Likert-type scales, with 1 D not at all and 9 D very much so. There were no signiWcant diVerences in how committed participants were to success, t (44) D 1.05, p D .30, r D .16, nor how upset they would be with failure, t (44) D .74, p D .46, r D .11. In addition, neither variable was signiWcantly correlated with response latency on the recognition memory task (r D ¡.03, p D .83; r D ¡.18, p D .23, respectively). These results indicate that the data do not support the contention that the two conditions diVered in the magnitude of their commitment or motivation to the concentration task, and therefore suggest that an alternative account citing diVerences in these variables is not tenable.
Self-eYcacy.
Another alternate explanation of the results would suggest that diVerences in the instructions during the mindset manipulation might have altered participants' sense of self-eYcacy. By having participants in the deliberative mindset deliberate over which task they wanted to perform, this account would propose that the manipulation might have inadvertently suggested that they were less capable than those participants in the implemental mindset condition. When an individual feels less capable of performing a task, there might be reason to believe that they attend less carefully to the task and are more likely to process incidental information.
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To address this alternate account, we compared responses to an item measuring self-eYcacy ("To what extent did you feel you had the skills and abilities necessary to perform well on this task?"). Participants responded using 9-item Likert-type scales, with 1 D not at all and 9 D very much so. Responses to this item did not diVer signiWcantly between condition, t (44) D .74, p D .46, r D .11. EYcacy was also not signiWcantly correlated with response latency on the recognition test (r D ¡.03, p D .87). These analyses indicate that the data do not support an alternate account of the results that postulate diVerences in selfeYcacy.
Type of motivation.
A third alternate explanation of the results would suggest that participants experienced diVering types of motivation while performing the computer task. This account would propose that the instructions given to participants in the deliberative mindset condition led them to be motivated for diVerent reasons than those in the implemental mindset condition. Whereas participants in the implemental mindset condition may have felt more internally motivated when they were given the choice of tasks to perform, participants in the deliberative mindset condition may have felt more externally motivated. Despite giving both conditions a chance to choose which task to perform, this account would suggest that participants in the deliberative mindset condition nevertheless might have felt less autonomous and less self-motivated than those in the implemental mindset condition.
To assess potential diVerences in types of motivation between mindset conditions, participants completed Sheldon and Elliot's (1999) four-item measure of self-concordance. Self-concordance is deWned as the degree to which people pursue a given goal with feelings of intrinsic interest and identity congruence (Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001 ). Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they were motivated by four diVerent reasons: external ("somebody else wants you to"), introjected ("you would feel ashamed, guilty, or anxious if you didn't"), identiWed ("you really believe that it is an important goal to have"), and internal ("for the fun and enjoyment which the goal will provide"). As Sheldon and Elliot (1999) recommend, selfconcordance was calculated by subtracting the sum of the Wrst two items from the sum of the last two items. We also included an item designed to measure perceived autonomy in choice of tasks ("How much autonomy or freedom of choice did you have in making your decision as to which computer task you wanted to do (Wrst)?"). Participants were asked to respond to all questions using 9-item Likerttype scales, with 1 D not at all and 9 D very much so. If the Wndings of this study were a function of diVerences in motivation rather than mindset, we would expect to Wnd diVerences in self-concordance and perceive autonomy.
Although there were no signiWcant diVerences in per- These results indicate that although there was a near-signiWcant diVerence in self-concordance, this diVerence does not account for the signiWcant diVerence in response latency on the recognition memory test. Moreover, there were no diVerences in perceived autonomy, and adjusting for reported levels of perceived autonomy did not change the magnitude of the diVerences due to mindset on the recognition memory test. This suggests that there is a lack of compelling evidence for a re-interpretation of the results that emphasize diVerences in the type of motivation participants experienced.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 provided support for the hypothesis that deliberative and implemental mindsets diVer in selective processing of incidental information. Participants in a deliberative mindset evidenced better recognition for incidental words presented during the concentration test than those in an implemental mindset. Although the two conditions did not diVer signiWcantly in recognition accuracy, participants in the deliberative mindset condition took less time to recognize those incidental words than did those in the implemental mindset. Shorter recognition response latencies indicate less eVort or diYculty in accessing memory traces of information that individuals were previously exposed to. That those in a deliberative mindset required less time to recognize the incidental words suggests that they had engaged in less selective processing than those in an implemental mindset. To rule out alternate explanations for our Wndings, we included several measures of degree of motivation, self-eYcacy, and type of motivation. Analyses of the results from these measures did not provide any support for these re-interpretations. Together, these results provide preliminary evidence that selective processing of incidental information is a distinguishing feature between deliberative and implemental mindsets. Moreover, the eVect of mindsets on selective processing appeared to occur pre-consciously (without conscious intent and initiation); that is, even when conscious strategies of information search and exposure are circumvented.
That participants in a deliberative mindset outperformed those in an implemental mindset on the recognition memory task is particularly surprising in light of the instructions that were provided to participants during the mindset manipulation. Recall that participants in a deliber-
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ative mindset were instructed to continue deliberating over their choice of tasks while engaged in the performance task (the computerized d2 Mental Concentration Test). That is, participants were instructed to ask themselves throughout the task "whether the task was right" for them or not. Performing the task while deliberating over a decision can be viewed as a dual-task setting, one that induces cognitive load. This increased load should have made attending to and encoding incidental stimuli much more diYcult. Thus, that participants in the deliberative mindset performed better on the recognition memory task than those in the implemental mindset despite increased cognitive load speaks to the power of the pre-conscious cognitive processes associated with each respective mindset.
It should also be noted that the faster response latencies by those in the deliberative mindset was speciWc to the recognition task and did not generalize to the concentration performance task. That is, although there were signiWcant diVerences between the two mindsets on the recognition memory test, there were no diVerences on the d2 concentration task. This suggests that the faster response latencies by those in the deliberative mindset as compared to the implemental mindset are not indicative of a more general speedup eVect, but rather one that is speciWc to recognition memory of incidental information.
In Study 1, we did not separate the semantic content of the goal that participants were pursuing from the measurement task. The goal that we activated was directly related to the computerized performance task. To replicate Study 1 and to provide more compelling evidence of mindset diVerences in selective processing, in Study 2, we separated the priming manipulation from the computer task, making sure that the goal we activated was unrelated to performing our measurement task. The transfer of cognitive procedures from one task to an unrelated task is the hallmark of mindset priming (Gollwitzer, 1990) . Without demonstrating such a transfer, any diVerences between conditions are attributable to the diVerences in the task at hand, rather than the hypothesized cognitive procedures associated with each mindset. To induce mindsets, we used a classic manipulation of deliberative and implemental mindsets used in a number of previous mindset experiments (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 1990, Study 2; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989, Study 2; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) . We measured pre-conscious information processing of incidental information in the same manner as in Study 1, using performance on a recognition memory test of incidental stimuli presented in the modiWed d2 Mental Concentration Task as our dependent variable.
Study 2
Method Participants
Thirty-eight students at New York University participated in the study in exchange for course credit. They were randomly assigned to the deliberative and implemental mindset conditions, and were distributed evenly across conditions.
Materials and procedures
Participants were run individually, or in groups of two. They were each seated in front of a computer inside a soundproof cubicle, which prevented them from seeing and hearing any other participant. As in Study 1, participants were informed that they were participating in a study that was ostensibly designed to measure their concentration potential. They were told that they would be performing a computer task designed to measure their capacity to focus and attend to information. Prior to performing the computer task, however, participants were asked to complete a pen-and-paper task. They were told that another psychology research laboratory was interested in surveying the student population, and was including a short questionnaire in the same study session. Unbeknownst to the participants, this questionnaire was actually a standard mindset induction used in previous research (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989 , Study 2; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) . To ensure that the experimenter remained blind to condition assignment, each packet included a uniform cover sheet.
Mindset manipulation. Participants in the deliberative mindset condition were asked to indicate an unresolved personal problem for which they had not yet come to any decision. As in other mindset studies (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989 , Study 2; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) , deliberative mindset participants were Wrst asked to generate the immediate pros and cons involved in making a decision involving a change with respect to their personal problem. They were then asked to record the long-term pros and cons with making such a decision. After listing both short and longterm consequences for a decision to change, they were then asked to repeat the exercise for making a decision that would maintain the status quo with respect to their personal problem.
Those in the implemental mindset condition were asked to indicate a resolvable problem for which they had made a decision or intention to act, but had not yet initiated any direct action. Participants were asked to list Wve steps that they could take to resolve the personal problem. For each step, they were then asked to indicate when, where, and how each step was to be performed to successfully bring resolution to the problem.
Performance and recognition memory tasks. After completing the mindset manipulation, participants performed the same modiWed d2 Mental Concentration Task as in Study 1. As before, when they were Wnished with the computer task, they answered a series of questionnaires. Participants Wrst completed several items designed to account for potential alternative explanations for the predicted pattern of results. These measures and the rationale for including them were the same as in Study 1, with the addition of the
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Positive and Negative AVective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to account for alternate explanations based on mood. After completing all measures, participants were probed for suspicion regarding the experimental manipulations and asked to guess what function they thought the words in the d2 Mental Concentration Task had. When they were Wnished with the questionnaires (about 5 min), participants were presented with the same computerized recognition memory task as in Study 1. They were then carefully debriefed and dismissed.
Results d2 mental concentration task performance
As in Study 1, performance on the d2 Mental Concentration Task by mindset was measured using number of errors and response latencies. Response latencies were transformed using a base-10 logarithmic transformation to correct for excessive skew. A 2 (condition: implemental vs. 
Recognition memory task performance
Performance on the recognition task was analyzed using accuracy and response latencies as dependent variables. As in Study 1, as false alarm rates were equal to zero on some occasions, the traditionally used discriminability index dЈ could not be calculated to measure accuracy. Instead, the nonparametric discriminability index, AЈ, was calculated for each participant on the basis of their correct hits and false alarms in the recognition task to measure accuracy (Pollack & Norman, 1964) . All response latencies less than 300 ms and greater than 3000 ms were excluded from the analysis (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) . This accounted for less than 4% of the data. Response latencies were then logtransformed to correct for excessive skew. Means of these log-transformed response latencies associated only with correct responses were then calculated for each participant and entered into the analysis (Anderson, 1983; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) . As predicted, recognition accuracy between the mindset conditions was statistically diVerent, 
Alternate explanations
As in Study 1, we included several measures to rule out alternate explanations for our results. Accordingly, we used the same measures of commitment, self-eYcacy, and intrinsic motivation as in the previous study. There was a nearly signiWcant diVerence in commitment to performing well on the concentration task, t ( Still, adjusting for all of these variables as separate covariates in analyses did not change the results (i.e., the eVect of mindset on recognition memory of incidental words). These Wndings indicate that alternate explanations based on diVerences between condition as a function of commitment, self-eYcacy, and self-concordance are not compelling.
To examine an additional potential account of the results based on mood, we analyzed responses to the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988 ). An alternate account of the results based on mood would suggest that the instructions to deliberate over one's current problems might have induced a negative mood, which is associated with systematic processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990) . The re-interpretation would propose that more systematic processing might have led to enhanced processing of incidental stimuli. Contrary to this mood-based account, results from the PANAS indicate that there were no signiWcant diVerences in reported positive or negative mood. Mood was also not correlated with recognition accuracy. In line with prior mindset research testing the eVects of mindsets on biased inferences (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) , reinterpretations of the results based on diVerences in mood are not supported by the data.
Discussion
The results of Study 2, as in Study 1, supported the hypothesis that deliberative and implemental mindsets diVer in selective processing of incidental information. In contrast to the results of Study 1, although there were no diVerences the time it took participants to recognize incidental words, those in a deliberative mindset more accurately recognized incidental words than those in an implemental mindset. This enhanced recognition accuracy conceptually replicates the results of Study 1 and suggests that incidental information presented during the concentration task was processed to a greater degree in the deliberative mindset as compared to the implemental mindset. Together, these two studies indicate that there are diVerences in pre-conscious processing of incidental information in deliberative and implemental mindsets.
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As in Study 1, we included several items to account for potential alternate explanations of the results, although such re-interpretations were less compelling to begin with due to the change in the manner by which we manipulated deliberative and implemental mindsets. These results indicated that as in Study 1, alternate explanations based on diVerences between mindset with respect to commitment, self-eYcacy, and intrinsic motivation are not well-supported by the data. Re-interpretations based on diVerences in mood were also not supported by the data. The diVerences in selective processing in this study, therefore, appear not to be a function of these variables.
Although Studies 1 and 2 provided support for the hypothesis that deliberative and implemental mindsets diVer in selective processing of incidental information, it is not clear whether deliberative mindsets are less selective, implemental mindsets are more selective, or a combination of both. In Study 3, we used the same paradigm as Study 2, but included a mindset-neutral control condition. By comparing the selective processing of the two mindsets against this control condition, we hoped not only to replicate the results of the previous studies, but to also gain better understanding of the direction of the eVect.
Study 3
Method Participants
Fifty-four students at New York University participated in the study in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to condition: 16 were in the control condition, 16 in the deliberative mindset condition, and 23 in the implemental mindset condition.
Materials and procedures
Participants were run in groups of 1-4, and randomly assigned to condition. Each sat in a cubicle equipped with a computer and desk space. Materials and procedures were identical to Study 2, with the addition of a control condition. Instead of completing a mindset manipulation, those assigned to the control condition were asked to list the Wrst 20 thoughts that appeared in their minds. They were encouraged to write down any thought that occurred to them, and to record them regardless of content.
All participants then performed the same modiWed d2 Mental Concentration Task as in Studies 1 and 2. After Wlling out the questionnaires to assess potential alternate explanations of the results, participants performed a recognition memory test of the items presented during the concentration task. Participants were then carefully debriefed and dismissed.
Results d2 mental concentration task performance
As in both Studies 1 and 2, performance on the d2 Mental Concentration Task by condition was measured using number of errors and response latencies. Response latencies were transformed using a base-10 logarithmic transformation to correct for excessive skew. 
Recognition memory task performance
Performance on the recognition memory test, as in both previous studies, was measured on accuracy and average response latencies. As false alarm rates were equal to zero on some occasions, the nonparametric discriminability index, AЈ, was calculated for each participant on the basis of their correct hits and false alarms in the recognition task to measure accuracy (Pollack & Norman, 1964) . All response latencies less than 300 ms and greater than 3000 ms were excluded from the analysis (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) , which accounted for less than 3% of the data. Response latencies were logtransformed to correct for excessive skew. Only those response latencies associated with correct responses were then averaged for each participant and entered into the analysis (Anderson, 1983; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) . A one-way ANOVA by condition revealed statistically signiWcant diVerences between the conditions on accuracy, 
Alternate explanations
As in Studies 1 and 2, we included several measures to rule out alternate explanations for our results. Accordingly, we used the same measures of commitment, self-eYcacy, intrinsic motivation, and mood. There were no signiWcant diVerences in any of the measures by condition, nor were there any signiWcant correlations between these variables and recognition accuracy. Moreover, adjusting for these as covariates did not alter the results reported above. These variables therefore do not appear to tenable bases for alternate interpretations of the data.
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Discussion
As in Study 2, participants in a deliberative mindset evidenced greater recognition accuracy of incidental words than those in an implemental mindset. This provides further support for the hypothesis that these two mindsets diVer in selective processing of incidental information. Moreover, such diVerences appear to have occurred in the absence of conscious information processing strategies. These results replicate the previous two studies. Results further suggest that the eVects of mindsets on selective processing appear to be driven by an enhanced openness and readiness to process incidental information by deliberative mindsets. Those in a deliberative mindset demonstrated greater recognition memory of incidental stimuli presented during the concentration task than both those in the implemental and control conditions. That the implemental and control conditions did not diVer suggests that the eVect is not driven by enhanced selective processing. Rather, it appears that deliberative mindsets are characterized by preconscious processes that facilitate processing of incidental information available in the environment.
General discussion
Deliberative mindsets and pre-conscious open-mindedness
Mindset theory suggests that that the deliberative mindsets should be more open-minded in information processing, whereas implemental mindsets should be more closedminded. As such, we proposed that deliberative mindsets would evidence less selective processing of incidental information, as it behooves individuals to consider all available information when trying to make a good goal decision. In contrast, we hypothesized that the implemental mindset should demonstrate comparatively greater selective processing, as processing of information not directly task-relevant could be distracting and detract from one's ability to focus on performing the task at hand. In three studies, we found evidence for this hypothesis.
In Study 1, participants in a deliberative mindset took less time than those in an implemental mindset to recognize whether or not they had previously been exposed to incidental words presented in a concentration task. In Studies 2 and 3, participants in a deliberative mindset had higher recognition accuracy of these words as compared to those in an implemental mindset. The results from all three studies indicate that deliberative individuals more easily accessed memory traces of information incidental to the ongoing task than implemental individuals. This occurred even when the mindsets induced were unrelated to the performance task that measured the cognitive diVerences (Studies 2 and 3). This "carry over" eVect of mindsets is evidence that strongly suggests that whereas the implemental mindset is more selective, the deliberative mindset is more openminded to incidental information available in one's immediate environment.
Study 3 allowed us to clarify whether the eVect of mindset on selective information processing was due to enhanced open-mindedness in the deliberative mindset, enhanced closed-mindedness in the implemental mindset, or both. Results from this study suggested that the change in selective processing as a function of mindset is attributable to less selective Wltering of incidental information in the deliberative mindset, as opposed to greater selective Wltering in the implemental mindset. Whereas the recognition memory for incidental stimuli of individuals in an implemental mindset mirrored those in a mindset-neutral control condition, recognition was signiWcantly higher among those in a deliberative mindset. That is, the diVerence in information processing between deliberative and implemental mindsets is driven by a greater receptivity to incidental information by the deliberative mindset. As hypothesized by mindset theory, the deliberative mindset, to facilitate choosing between goals, engages cognitive procedures that open the mind to task-incidental stimuli, thus considering carefully all available information that might be relevant to a goal decision.
Remarkably, the results of these studies suggest that changes in selective processing as a function of mindset occur pre-consciously. By pre-conscious, we refer to cognitive processes that initiated and operate outside of conscious intent (Bargh, 1994) . Researchers have argued that reactions to stimuli that require a response within 300 ms are not consciously controlled (e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Neely, 1977) . Participants in all studies reported here were presented with incidental stimuli for only 300 ms prior to the primary performance task materials. Moreover, the presentation of these stimuli was random and located in the center of the participants' visual Welds. Together, the short exposure times and random central presentation of the incidental stimuli should have precluded conscious strategies of avoidance, thus any increment in processing should be considered outside of conscious intent. These data suggest that the act of deliberating and making a goal decision produces dramatic changes in the cognitive processing of information even when individuals do not intend such changes. In our view, these pre-conscious changes occur to support individuals' progression through the various stages of goal pursuit.
Speed and accuracy
The signiWcant diVerences between the mindsets on recognition memory were more evident with response latencies in Study 1, and with accuracy in Studies 2 and 3. Although we conceptually replicated support for our predictions across three studies, the Wndings were not apparent in the same measure of information processing (i.e., accuracy vs. response latencies). As both measures are well-established indices of information processing (Anderson, 1983) , we believe that this inconsistency does not necessarily undermine the support for our hypotheses. To be fair, as is evident in the summary table of results (Table 1) , the pattern
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of results for accuracy in Study 1, although not statistically signiWcant, was consistent with those in Studies 2 and 3. Moreover, the diVerences in response latency in Study 3, also not statistically signiWcant, were consistent with the Wndings from Study 1. To test whether the eVect of deliberative vs. implemental mindsets diVered between studies, and whether the aggregated Wndings were statistically signiWcant across the three studies on both measures, we performed a series of meta-analyses as recommended by Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991) . These analyses revealed that the eVects of mindsets in of the three studies did not diVer signiWcantly from each other neither with respect to accuracy, 2 (2) D 1.45, p D .49, nor response latency, 2 (2) D 3.81, p D .15.
5 Moreover, aggregating the Wndings across all three studies, deliberative mindsets led to greater accuracy, Z D 3.49, p < .01, and faster response latencies, Z D 1.89, p D .06, than implemental mindsets. Thus, from a meta-analytic perspective, the results from these studies may not be as discrepant as appears at Wrst glance and reveal mindset diVerences with both accuracy and speed measures.
Nevertheless, we are cognizant that a conservative interpretation of these three studies suggests a need to reconcile why at times the diVerences in mindsets are evidenced in response latencies, whereas at other times they are revealed with accuracy. This apparent discrepancy may reXect diVerences in the sensitivity of speed and accuracy as performance measures resulting from diVerences in how the mindsets were induced between the two studies. Research has shown that even subtle changes in the framing of a task can lead to change the sensitivity of speed and accuracy measures, even when participants are explicitly instructed to be concerned with both speed and accuracy. Förster, Higgins, and Bianco (2003) , for example, have shown that both chronic and situational regulatory foci (prevention vs. promotion orientations) can change whether individuals display performance diVerences with respect to speed or accuracy. They found that despite giving participants identical instructions (emphasizing both speed and accuracy as equally important measures), performance diVerences were more evident with speed as a performance measure when participants were in a promotion focus (a motivational orientation toward ideals and gains/nongains), and more evident with accuracy as a performance measure when participants were in a prevention focus (a motivational orientation toward oughts and nonlosses/losses). The relative sensitivity of speed and accuracy measures in detecting performances diVerences, therefore, can be a function of the strategic motivational orientations of individuals.
It seems plausible to suggest that research participants in Study 1 may have been in a more promotion focus, whereas those in Studies 2 and 3 may have been in more prevention focus. In Study 1, participants were asked to choose which of two tasks they wanted to perform. The ability to decide which task one "wanted" to perform may have been a subtle manipulation of a promotion focus, which stresses one's wants, wishes, and ideals (Higgins, 1997) . On the other hand, in Studies 2 and 3, participants were not given a choice of tasks. As a result, they may have felt more "required" to perform the concentration task, which may have subtly induced a prevention focus, which stresses one's obligations, responsibilities, and oughts (Higgins, 1997) . Empirically supporting these suggestions, participants in Study 2 (M D ¡4.68, SD D 5.32) and Study 3 (M D ¡4.44, SD D 5.25) reported much less self-concordance than those in Study 1 (M D ¡.48, SD D 6.0). The more negative one's self-concordance score is, the more one is motivated by extrinsic ("somebody else wants me to") and introjected motivations ("I would feel ashamed, guilty, or anxious if I didn't"). Shame, guilt, and anxiety are motivational responses associated with concerns about one's responsibilities and duties, and reXect greater prevention regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997) . External sources of motivation are also associated with greater prevention regulatory focus, particularly when linked to shame and guilt (the "ought-other" self; Higgins, 1996) . In sum, these data support interpreting the shift in sensitivity of response latencies and accuracy as performance measures in detecting diVerences between mindsets from Study 1 to Studies 2 and 3 as a function of strategic orientations induced by the use of diVerent mindset inductions. That is, response latencies may have been more sensitive to performance diVerences in Study 1 due to a subtle promotion focus framing, whereas accuracy may have been more sensitive to performance diVerences in Studies 2 and 3 due to a subtle prevention focus framing.
Encoding vs. retrieval
Although the three studies reported in this paper indicate that deliberative and implemental mindsets diVer in selective processing of goal-incidental information, it is not clear whether such selective processing occurs at 
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encoding or retrieval. That is, selective information processing diVerences between the mindsets may be due to diVerent attentional processes at initial exposure to incidental information, or by diVerences in the ease of accessing information from memory at the time of recognition. Both selective encoding and selective retrieval of incidental information are consistent with mindset theory's proposition that deliberative mindsets are more open-minded than implemental mindsets. Future research that addresses whether selective processing occurs at encoding, retrieval, or both, however, is clearly warranted.
Implications for motivation and cognition research Mindsets
By providing evidence for diVerences in pre-conscious cognitive processing of incidental information, these three studies extend and build upon previous mindset research. In particular, these results develop previous work by Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987, Study 2) in demonstrating that deliberative mindsets are associated with greater open-mindedness than the implemental mindset. As stated in the Introduction, this previous experiment focused on testing diVerences in working memory associated with each mindset, and found that the deliberative mindset led to broader working memory spans than the implemental mindset. The present three studies suggest that in addition to enhancing working memory, the deliberative mindset leads to greater selective processing of information that is incidental to one's goals. Moreover, the present data further suggest that such reduced selectivity occurs pre-consciously; that is, without conscious initiation or intent.
Thus, in addition to the mindset features of cognitive tuning and biased inferences, these results suggest that a third distinguishing feature of mindsets is how information available in one's environment is processed. Deliberative mindsets, as compared to implemental mindsets, are characterized by pre-conscious cognitive procedures that lead to decreased selective Wltering and thus to greater openness. Together, these results suggest that there are a number of cognitive procedures that support and promote successful goal attainment. These cognitive procedures are activated at appropriate stages of goal pursuit to help individuals eVectively and eYciently accomplish the tasks necessary at each phase (Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999) .
Throughout this paper, we have used the terms "incidental" and "central" to refer to stimuli that diVer in their instrumentality in achieving an ongoing task. It is possible, however, that mindsets lead to diVerences in processing of information that is incidental vs. central in another meaning. Mindsets may lead to changes in one's breadth of attention, thus increasing or decreasing the processing of stimuli presented at the periphery of the visual Weld. The general open-mindedness of the deliberative mindset may not only lead individuals to process task-incidental information to a greater extent than implemental mindsets, but also to information that is located in peripheral areas of the visual Weld. The studies presented here do not address this question, as all information was presented in the center of the visual Weld. Thus, the possibility that the deliberative mindset expands one's attention to peripheral visual areas in addition to one's consideration of information incidental to an ongoing task remains to be tested.
Goal-relevant information processing
The three studies reported here also complement other Wndings reported by researchers interested in the intersection of motivation and cognition. For example, these studies dove-tail with recent research by Moskowitz (2002) , who has provided evidence for greater attention to goal-relevant information among individuals who had goals made cognitively accessible as compared to those who did not. Not only did individuals attend to goal-relevant stimuli to a greater degree when they were primed with goals, but these eVects also appeared to be pre-conscious or outside of conscious intent. The notion that implemental individuals (those involved in goal implementation as a result of heightened goal accessibility) pay greater attention to goal-relevant information is consistent with our proposal that selective information processing diVers whether one is deliberating between goals or actively implementing goals. It remains to be demonstrated empirically, however, whether mindsets produce changes in the automatic processing of goal-relevant stimuli, as the studies reported here addressed only the processing of stimuli incidental to an ongoing task. Nevertheless, Moskowitz's Wndings suggest that not only might deliberative mindsets make individuals more receptive to available information that may potentially inform their goal decisions, implemental mindsets may also make individuals more sensitive to stimuli directly relevant to the chosen goal.
Goal shielding
It is important to distinguish the selective information processing studied in this paper from extant work on "goal shielding," the protection of a goal intention from competing intentions (Kuhl, 1984; . By preventing individuals from falling prey to the temptation of alternative goal pursuits, goal shielding is theorized to be a crucial aspect of successful goal attainment. Goal shielding diVers from the selective information processing examined in this paper as it refers speciWcally to the inhibition of competing goal intentions. The selective processing reported here refers to the processing of information that is incidental, but not necessarily antagonistic, to one's current task goal. This information potentially could be useful, but its connection is not readily apparent. In our view, goal shielding and the selective information processing we have studied here are manifestations of the same, more general open-and closed-minded orientations of deliberative and implemental individuals. Thus, we would predict that implemental mindsets to be characterized more by goal shielding than deliberative mindsets. Prior to committing to a goal, goal shielding is nonsensical as there is no goal intention to protect. Instead, one should be open to all goal possibilities and carefully deliberate over which to pursue. Once a goal is chosen and goal pursuit eVorts engaged, however, one should selectively inhibit competing goal possibilities, as they may derail attainment of the chosen goal. Research on goal shielding has yet to address this possibility, as it has not incorporated diVerences in deliberative and implemental phases of goal pursuit (e.g., Shah et al., 2002) .
Conclusion
The recent convergence of motivation and cognition in social psychology has emphasized the role of cognitive processes in goal pursuit. In this paper, we have presented three studies that corroborate this claim. Deliberative and implemental mindsets diVer in selective information processing, with the deliberative mindset more open and receptive to all available information. The continued study of cognitive procedures, like selective information processing, which support goal pursuit (even without conscious awareness) promises to illuminate the remarkable ability of individuals to select appropriate goals, and to implement these decisions through planning and action.
